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Abstract—This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks
against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the
conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing
the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions
under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced
BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI
attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix
is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system
indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can
avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based
on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, phasor measurement units (PMUs)
have been widely deployed in power systems for monitoring,
protection, and control purposes. With the ability to directly
measure the bus voltages and phase angles with high sampling
rate and accuracy, PMUs have the potential to play a signifi-
cant role in real-time power system state estimation (SE) [1],
dynamic security assessment [2], [3], system protection [4],
and system awareness [5].
The communication and computing devices that enable
wide-area real-time monitoring and control of the electric
power system have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to
cyber-attacks [6]–[8]. As an increasingly important component
of these devices, PMUs are also prone to cyber-attacks. There-
fore, it is of great importance to evaluate the vulnerability of
PMUs to potential cyber-attacks. The authors of [9], [10] clas-
sify the potential cyber-attacks on PMUs as communication
link damage attacks, denial of service attacks, data spoofing
attacks including GPS spoofing attacks and false data injection
(FDI) attacks.
FDI attacks involve an intelligent attacker who replaces a
subset of measurements with counterfeits. We focus on the
sub-class of unobservable attacks which render the false data
as unobservable to the operator. For supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems, prior work [11]–[18] has
shown that attacks can be designed to have severe physical
[14]–[18] and/or economical consequences [19], [20]. The
authors of [18] were the first to determine the conditions under
which an attacker with limited resources and capabilities can
launch an unobservable FDI attack on SCADA measurements.
However, such conditions are not known for attacks on PMU
measurements. Furthermore, the high cost of PMU installation
restricts the PMUs to be placed only at a subset of all buses.
As a consequence, only a subset of bus voltages and branch
currents are directly measured by PMUs. This leads to the new
question that we address in this paper: under what conditions
is it feasible to launch unobservable attacks against PMUs?
In [21], Kim and Tong introduce a protection scheme by
placing secure PMUs to simultaneously ensure observability
and prevent FDI attacks. However, as PMUs are also prone to
attacks, their approach cannot thwart FDI attacks when PMU
measurements are compromised by attackers. The authors of
[22] propose a decentralized FDI attack detection approach
based on the Markov graph of bus voltage angles. The
drawback of this approach is that it may not perform well
when the system experiences a disturbance. An expectation-
maximization based detector is introduced by Lee and Kundur
in [23] to detect FDI attacks on PMUs, but it only assumes
DC power flow model and requires the bus power injections
to be known.
Using measurements obtained from deployed PMUs in the
grid, [24] and [25] illustrate the low-rank nature of PMU data
when it is structured in a matrix. Utilizing this low-rank ob-
servation, [26], [27] propose a low-rank decomposition (LRD)
based detector to detect FDI attacks on PMU measurements.
On the other hand, the FDI attacks of most interest are those
in which the attacker is not omniscient and omnipresent —
this limited knowledge and limited capabilities of FDI attacks
are often captured (see, for e.g., [11]–[17]) by restricting
attacker knowledge to a subset of the network and restricting
counterfeits to a small number of meters. This latter restriction
along with the above mentioned low-rank properties of a block
of PMU data suggests that the resulting counterfeit PMU
measurement matrix can be viewed as a linear combination of
a low-rank (actual) measurement matrix and a sparse attack
matrix (counterfeit additions to measurement). The authors of
[26], [27] show that an LRD-based detector can identify the
column sparse FDI attack matrix assuming that the attacker
attacks the same set of PMU measurements over time.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced bad data detector
(BDD) that utilizes Kirchhoff’s current law (KCL) at zero
injection buses (ZIBs) in addition to the conventional residual-
based BDD. We then identify a sufficient condition under
which an attack is unobservable to this enhanced BDD. Fur-
thermore, we propose a class of multiplicative unobservable
FDI attacks that multiply the state matrix by a full rank matrix,
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thereby preserving the rank of the measurement matrix. We
illustrate that these attacks can bypass the LRD detector via
simulation on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system.
II. PMU MEASUREMENT MODEL
Throughout, we assume the power system is completely
observable by PMUs. A PMU placed at a bus collects the
complex voltage measurements at this bus and current mea-
surements on all branches connect to it, typically at a rate of
30 samples per second [28]. These measurements are linear
functions of the states, i.e., the complex bus voltages. Let
p be the number of buses (states), and n be the number of
synchrophasor measurements in the power system, at each
time instant t, the PMU measurement model is given by
wt = Hxt + et (1)
where wt is the n × 1 measurement vector; xt is the p × 1
state vector of complex bus voltages; et is an n × 1 additive
Gaussian noise vector whose entries are assumed to be i.i.d;
H is the n×p measurement Jacobian matrix. The least squares
estimate of xt, xˆt, is given by [29]
xˆt = H
+wt (2)
where H+ is the pseudo-inverse of H . The conventional
residual-based BDD performs χ2 test on the residual vector
r = wt −Hxˆt = wt −HH+wt (3)
to detect bad measurements.
Given an PMU placement scheme, (1) can be written as
wt =
[
Vt
It
]
+ et = Hxt + et =
[
I′
Y
]
xt + et, (4)
where Vt and It are available voltage and current measure-
ments at time t, respectively; I′ is the reduced identity matrix
with only rows corresponding to PMU buses; and Y is the
dependency matrix between available current measurements
and states. Each row of Y corresponds to a current measure-
ment Ii,j from bus i and bus j. It contains only two non-zero
entries, Yij at the ith entry and −Yij at jth entry, where Yij
is the admittance of the line between bus i and bus j.
PMU data collected over a block of time (e.g., 2 to 20
seconds) can be written as a matrix where each row vector
corresponds to all PMU measurements at one time instant and
each column vector consists of the measurements collected in
the same channel over a period of time. The PMU measure-
ments in (1) over N time instants can then be collected as
W = XHT + E (5)
where matrices W =
[
wT1 ; w
T
2 ; . . . ; w
T
N
]
, X =[
xT1 ; x
T
2 ; . . . ;x
T
N
]
, and E =
[
eT1 ; e
T
2 ; . . . ; e
T
N
]
are PMU mea-
surement matrix, state matrix, and noise matrix, respectively.
Note that wTt , x
T
t , and e
T
t for t = 1, 2, . . . , N are the
transpose of the measurement, state, and noise column vectors,
respectively, in (1).
III. UNOBSERVABLE FDI ATTACKS ON PMU
MEASUREMENTS
In an FDI attack, the attacker is assumed to control a subset
J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of measurements. Thus, the attacker may
replace W with
W¯ = W +D, (6)
where the column support of the measurement attack matrix
D, supp(D), is contained in J . An attack can bypass the
conventional residual-based BDD if D = CHT for some non-
zero matrix C, i.e.,
W¯ = W + CHT . (7)
From (2), the estimated state matrix without attack is given
by
Xˆ = WH+T , (8)
and the estimated state matrix under attack is given by
X¯ = W¯H+T = WH+T + CHTH+T = Xˆ + C. (9)
The residual matrix under attack is given by
R = W¯ − X¯HT
= W + CHT − (Xˆ + C)HT
= W − XˆHT (10)
is the same as that without attack. Therefore, attacks in the
form of (7) cannot be detected by the conventional BDD.
A. Enhanced BDD Utilizing ZIBs
An attack in the form of (7) is perfectly unobservable if the
network is comprised of only injection buses. However, if the
network includes some ZIBs, (7) is insufficient to keep the
attack unobservable. For example, in the 4-bus system shown
in Fig. 1, assume the attacker controls the PMU at bus 1 but
not that at bus 4. If the attacker wants to change the state at
bus 2, it needs to change measurement I1,2. This attack is in
the form of (7), and hence, can bypass the conventional BDD.
However, since the attacker does not control the PMU at bus
4, it cannot change measurements V4 and I3,4. As a result,
the state at bus 3 cannot be changed. If the state at bus 2 is
changed, the current I2,3 is changed. Thus, I2,3 6= I3,4, so the
KCL of ZIB 3 is violated under this attack.
1 2 3 4
PMU
PMU
ZIB
Fig. 1. 4-bus system illustrating that FDI attacks on PMUs can be detected
in the presence of ZIBs.
The example above illustrates the potential of ZIBs in
detecting FDI attacks. Let k be the number of ZIBs in the
2
system. For the ith (i ∈ 1, . . . , k) ZIB q, let M be the set of
all its neighboring buses, the dependency matrix A ∈ Ck×p
between injections at ZIBs and states is given by
Aij =

−∑
l
Ylq, j = q, l ∈M
Yjq, j ∈M
0, j /∈M.
(11)
For instance, in the system shown in Fig. 1, k = 1,
A = [0, Y23, −(Y23 + Y34), Y34]. (12)
We define a new residual matrix for the enhanced BDD
Re =
[
W¯ − W¯H+THT
X¯AT
]
=
[
R
X¯AT
]
(13)
In the absence of noise, an attack-free state matrix X always
satisfies XAT = 0. The enhanced BDD performs χ2 test on
Re, and bad data is flagged if Re fails the test.
B. Feasible Conditions for Unobservable Attacks
As stated in the Introduction, the cost of placing PMUs
in power systems is much higher than that of placing power
meters. Because of this cost, PMU measurements are typically
available only at a subset of buses, in contrast to SCADA
measurements that are available almost everywhere in the
network. Besides, PMUs and SCADA system collect different
types of measurements. Thus, the conditions for launching
unobservable FDI attacks on SCADA system do not directly
generalize to PMUs.
An attack is defined to be unobservable by the enhanced
BDD if, in the absence of noise, there exists a state attack
matrix C 6= 0 that satisfies (7) and
CAT = 0. (14)
Recall that J is the subset of PMU measurements con-
trolled by the attacker. This attack is feasible if and only if
supp(CHT ) ⊆ J .
Suppose the attacker wishes to change the state at a single
bus. As we have shown through the example in Sec. III-A, it
may not be possible to launch this attack without detection by
just changing the state at this bus. What we wish to find out
is the conditions under which this attack is feasible. The goal
of this attack is to change the state at a single bus, but not
necessarily changing the state only at this bus.
Similar to [30], let b be the bus that the attacker wishes
to change state, the attack subgraph Sb can be constructed as
follows.
1. Include bus b in Sb.
2. Include all buses adjacent to bus b in Sb.
3. If there is a ZIB on the boundary of Sb, extend Sb to
include all adjacent buses of such a ZIB.
4. Repeat step 3 until no bus on the boundary is ZIB.
When more than one bus are to be attacked, the final subgraph
will be given by the union of all these subgraphs.
S = ∪Sb,∀b ∈ supp(C). (15)
2 3 5
4PMU
ZIB
1PMU
ZIB
PMU
6
Fig. 2. 6-bus system illustrating that coltrolling all PMUs in S is unnecessary
to launch unobservable FDI attacks
An attacker who has control over all PMUs in S can
launch an unobservable FDI attack. If there are no ZIBs in S,
this condition is sufficient and necessary to make this attack
unobservable. However, this is merely a sufficient condition,
if there are ZIBs in S . We now illustrate an example through
the 6-bus system in Fig. 2. Suppose the attacker wishes to
change the state at bus 5. If we apply the subgraph approach
described above, the resulting subgraph is the whole system.
Thus, it would appear that the attacker needs to control all
three PMUs. However, if the attacker controls the PMUs at bus
4 and 6, it can launch this attack without being detected. If the
attacker wants to change V5, I5,6 and I3,5 are changed. Since
the attacker does not control the PMU at bus 1, then according
to KCL of ZIB 2, V1, V2, I1,2, I2,3 cannot be changed, and
consequently V3 cannot be changed. To satisfy KCL at bus
3, the attacker can change I3,4 and V4, and then this attack
becomes feasible. Clearly, this attack is feasible under the
condition that attacker only control PMUs at bus 4 and 6.
Generalizing these conditions is out of the scope of this paper.
IV. MULTIPLICATIVE ATTACKS
A. Prior Work: Attack Detection Based on Low-Rank Matrix
Decomposition
Conventional BDDs cannot detect unobservable FDI attacks
in the form of (6). However, exploiting the low-rank nature of
the high-dimensional PMU data matrix W , the authors in [26]
propose a new attack detection mechanism based on LRD so as
to separate the low-rank matrix W and column sparse matrix
CHT in (6). The LRD detector is briefly reviewed below.
Given a post-attack measurement matrix W¯ , an estimate Wˆ
of the actual measurement matrix, and the attack matrix Cˆ are
formed by solving the following convex optimization problem:
minimize
Wˆ∈CN×n,Cˆ∈CN×p
‖Wˆ‖∗ + λ‖Cˆ‖1,2 (16a)
subject to W¯ = Wˆ + CˆH¯T (16b)
where ‖Wˆ‖∗ is the nuclear norm of Wˆ ; ‖Cˆ‖1,2 is the l1,2-
norms of Cˆ, i.e., the sum of l2-norm of columns in Cˆ; λ
is a weighting parameter; and H¯ is the normalized Jacobian
matrix, where for each row vector Hi, H¯i = Hi/‖Hi‖. The
objective (16a) is to minimize the rank of Wˆ (captured by its
3
nuclear norm) and the column sparsity of Cˆ (captured by its
l1,2-norm).
After obtaining the optimal solution, (Wˆ ∗, Cˆ∗) for (16),
the set of attacked measurements and states can be identified
as supp(Cˆ∗H¯T ) and supp(Cˆ∗), respectively. Assume there
exists unobservable attacks in W¯ , such that W¯ = W +CH¯T .
The authors of [26] prove that for a specific range of λ, i.e.,
λ ∈ [λmin, λmax], the optimization in (16) can successfully
identify supp(C), i.e., supp(Cˆ∗) = supp(C), under the
assumption that every non-zero column of CH¯T does not lie
in the column space of W .
B. Attack Design
We assume that the attacker has the following knowledge
and capabilities:
1) The attacker has full system topology information.
2) The attacker has control of the measurements in J .
Given a PMU measurement vector wt at time t, an attacker
can estimated state vector xˆt using (2), and construct false
measurements as
w¯t = H
TFT xˆt, (17)
where F is a full rank matrix. If the attacker does this for N
time instances, the resulting PMU measurement matrix can be
written in the form of (7) as:
W¯ = XˆFHT =W + CHT = XˆHT + CHT , (18)
C = X(F − I). (19)
In order to remain unobservable, the attack must satisfy (14):
CAT =Xˆ(F − I)AT = XFAT −XAT
=XˆFAT = 0. (20)
This class of attacks do not change the rank of the measure-
ment matrix W , and is potentially undetectable by the LRD
detector. However, the nuclear norm of W may change under
attack. Since the LRD detector uses the nuclear norm of the
measurement matrix as a proxy of its rank, these attacks may
still be detected by the LRD detector.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the efficacy of the unobservable
FDI attacks introduced in Sec. IV. To this end, we construct
the post-attack measurement matrix W¯ with as in (17). Sub-
sequently, we solve the LRD detection optimization problem
(16) for W¯ to check if the attack matrix C is detected. We
assume that the LRD detector selects 5 seconds worth of
PMU measurements data, i.e., N = 150, while the attacker
continuously injects bad data. The test system is the IEEE
RTS-24-bus system. The convex optimization problems for
LRD detection is solved with MOSEK on a 3.40 GHz PC with
32 GB RAM. λ is chosen to be 1.05 in the LRD detector.
A. Synthetic PMU Measurements Generation
An optimal PMU placement problem as introduced in [31]
is solved to ensure the system fully observable with PMUs.
The details of the PMU placement scheme and available
measurements are illustrated in Fig. 3. Buses in red are buses
with PMUs. We generate synthetic PMU data over 5 seconds
in the test system. A base case of the system operating status
is obtained by solving an AC optimal power flow problem.
To model realistic data with a disturbance, at the first time
instant t after 1 second, we change the load at each bus
by adding a random value d to the base load, such that
d ∼ N (0, 60
1.1(t−31)
)
. We then solve an AC power flow to
obtain the measured phasors of bus voltage and branch current
as measurements at time instant t. The singular values for the
synthetic measurement matrices are illustrated in Fig 4. It can
be seen that these synthetic measurements have the same low-
rank property as the actual PMU data as illustrated in [26].
Furthermore, we assume noiseless measurements, i.e., E = 0.
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Fig. 3. PMU placement in the IEEE RTS-24-bus system.
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Fig. 4. Singular values of the synthetic PMU data matrix in decreasing order.
B. Detection of Multiplicative FDI Attacks
We focus on unobservable 1-sparse multiplicative attacks
and exhaustively test their detectability. Due to space limita-
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tions, we illustrate our results using two specific cases. One
case illustrates that no attacks are detected, and the other
case illustrates that attacks are detected at incorrect buses. To
change the state at bus b, the entries of the attack matrix F
are set to be
Fij =
 1, i = j 6= bc, i = j = b
0, i 6= j.
(21)
Clearly F is a diagonal matrix, and hence F is full rank.
Note that due to the effects of ZIBs in (20), it is not feasible
to launch 1-sparse unobservable attacks targeting some buses,
since changing their states requires the attacker to also change
the state of other buses, as illustrated in the example in Sec.
III-B.
Fig. 5(a) illustrates the detection result when there is no
attack. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the attack detection result for an
attack on bus 4. F is constructed as in (21) with b = 4 and
c = ej0.2. Compare these two subfigures, we conclude that
the LRD detector fails to detect the attack at bus 4. Fig. 5(c)
illustrates the attack detection result for an attack on bus 16.
F is constructed as in (21) with b = 16 and c = ej0.3. The
LRD detector incorrectly detects that buses 18, 21, and 22 are
under attack.
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(c)
Fig. 5. Normalized l2-norm of each column of Cˆ∗ under (a) no attack; (b)
attack at bus 4; (c) attack at bus 16
A comparison of the l1,2-norm of Cˆ∗ with no attack and
with the attack at bus 4 for λ = [1.05, 1.5] is illustrated in Fig.
6. It can be seen that the ‖Cˆ∗‖1,2 with and without this attack
are very similar. Intuitively, this attack cannot be detected by
the LRD detector, and our result in Fig. 5(b) supports such
intuition.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, unobservable FDI attacks against PMUs have
been studied. We have introduced an enhanced BDD, and have
given conditions under which the attacks are unobservable.
Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks can
be identified by the LRD detector. In this work, we have
introduced a class of multiplicative attacks that can potentially
bypass the LRD detector. Future work involves generalizing
the conditions for launching unobservable FDI attacks and
developing countermeasures for such attacks.
1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5
0
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1.2 10
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Attack at bus 4
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Fig. 6. l1,2-norm of Cˆ∗ under no attack and attack at bus 4 for different λ
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